An unauthorised mark provides a possible site of incursion into law's authority and thus a possible avenue through which to pursue (more) just futures
Law is not situated only in statutes, courtrooms, judgements or judicial utterances, but is an affective part of our landscape, social and politicoscape that is both determined and determinative of the social construct we call law. Conceptualising law as a 'black letter' discipline, as something that is implicitly words on paper (or even for that matter bodies and voices in courtrooms) flattens what is an entire ecosystem of relationships.
Law is involved in its own reconstruction at both a positivist sense,; but also in an affective one.
Law is imbued with authority that is self perpetuating in the style of a hegemon. It seeks to extend itself and reinforce this authority.
Law, even in its progressions, is regressive. It seeks to reify its own authority. It is either written in the past for an imagined future, or looks to its previous applications and interprets the present into those frameworks of the past. Even where it is writing for an imagined future, the legal future it creates must necessarily look back to establish exactly what is meant by the law, its aims, and to re-establish its authority.
As such, the dominant hegemony of law is antithetical to radical futures.
If an unaithorised mark, operating as a minor literature may cause a rupture here in the makeup of law's authority, it poses the possibility of constructing a more radical future in or about law.
A mark may affect the affective landscape (socioscape, politicoscape) of law
Mark making impacts affect
Unauthorised mark making does something different to authorised mark making. Authorised mark making refies the dominant expressions and constructions of law whereas unauthorised mark making engages in a politics of shifting positionality and power. Unauthorised mark making thus has a different affect to that which is authorised.
Law is not oriented to just futures necessarily because it is 'not just' in its status in quo and its inherent need to self replicate. It requires disruption from an external force or body to shift this orientation or the authority imbued in the status in quo.
It is important to retain some boundedness in terms of thinking about these concepts. A mark may affect law. A mark may impact law. A mark may make an impression on law (and vice versa); but a mark is not reducable to law. Despite that there may be occassions where a mark can be subsumed by law - it is not inevitable that this will occiur. There must remain some space for considering the boundedness of these actors in order to account for the fact that the social and aesthetic affective 'scape' is also a political one.
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While Philippopoulos makes well the arguments around this affective landscape of law; his analysis makes everything law: senses such as smell and taste. In doing so he allows for an inevitablity of law's hegemonic reification of itself in a conservative (in that it reflects back on itself and seeks to put the future and the present into the frameworks of itself as past) fashion wheras I see radical possibilities in both affect and the political movement and articulation that may be situated within these fringe literatures of emotional production or engagement.
The affective landscape MAY be understood as a lawscape, but it is more likely a lawscape AND an affective landscape in which other forces, not entirely subsumed by law (although law will attempt to exert authority over them) are at play. This retention of some semblance of boundedness is essential to the possibility of change that is radical.
Mark making (and sound making and other cultural technologies) have affective and emotional potential.
Law, in its dominant form, is not just.
Law as body/ bodies and boundedness.
Street artists as Nomads in international law
Authorised mark making also affects law. It is lawful, and so reifies and strengthens law. It is an image of law, and an image of culture, politics and society as authorised by law. This is in turn
Temporality of Law
Philippopolous-Mihaloppoulos and others argue that the landscape can be undersotod as a lawscape. Using this argument, we can further argue that the mark, as an impact on the lawscape is affecting law.
Phillipopoulos- Mihaloppoulos would argue that the mark is law. I would seek redraw these arguments slightly and suggest that while it 'may' become law, it may also be something that is slighly bounded from it, and while it may create an impression on or shift the lanscape of law, it may also maintain some of its own character. Deleuze's field of difference may be a useful way of understanding this nature, as may be Deleuze and GUattari's work on bounded but detterritorialised bodies, and also Ahmed's work on impressions.
Awe - an emotion/ state with demonstrable capacity to affect social engagements, and hence (I argue) social, political, legal and affective bodies.
Radical futurism
Agamben, Foucault, Arendt and Kant on bodies and law as a body. Deleuze on more complicated understandings of bodies.
What are the unexplained structures of privelege at play in my assumptions about this?
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