One seat per district

Candidate with most votes wins (no majority required)

Seat share can diverge strongly from vote share

Many votes become “wasted” in safe seats or for losing candidates

Two-party tendency (mechanical + psychological effects)

Strong geographic representation

Frequent single-party governments if one party has efficient support

Simple ballots and counting

Clear local accountability (one representative)

Often yields decisive governments

Disproportional results; under-representation of smaller parties

Incentivizes strategic voting

Sensitive to districting (gerrymandering)

National legislatures with constituency focus

Round 1: all candidates compete

If no majority, top candidates go to Round 2 (rules vary)

Encourages coalition building between rounds

Can reduce “spoiler” effects vs FPTP

Winner typically has broader support (majority in Round 2)

Voters can vote sincerely in Round 1, strategically in Round 2

More costly/complex (two elections)

Turnout may drop in Round 2

Can still be disproportional nationally

Voters rank candidates

If no majority, last-place candidate eliminated; votes transfer by next preference until majority

Ensures majority winner in each district (after transfers)

Still not proportional overall (single-member districts)

Reduces vote-splitting among similar candidates

Rewards broadly acceptable candidates

Allows more sincere first choices

Counting more complex; longer results

Can produce non-intuitive outcomes (e.g., “center squeeze”)

Proportionality remains limited

District elects multiple seats (M>1)

Voters have up to M votes; top M candidates win

Largest group can sweep most/all seats (“winner-take-all” tendency)

Simple; can promote cohesive slates

Strongly disproportional; weak minority representation

Voters choose a party slate; party with most votes wins all seats

Extreme majoritarian conversion

Very decisive outcomes

Highly exclusionary; encourages polarization

Parties receive seats in proportion to vote share within a district/region

Seats allocated via formulas (e.g., D’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë) or quotas (Hare, Droop)

Closed list

Open list

Flexible list

Count party votes in district

Apply threshold rule (if any)

Allocate seats proportionally among eligible parties

Fill seats using list order or preference votes (open/flexible)

District magnitude (higher M → more proportional)

Legal threshold (e.g., 3–5%) and effective threshold (depends on M)

Allocation formula

National vs regional seat pooling

High proportionality; fewer wasted votes

Encourages multiparty representation

Better inclusion of smaller parties and dispersed minorities

Coalition governments more common (may reduce “decisiveness”)

Weaker geographic accountability if districts are large

Party fragmentation risk if thresholds are low

Voters rank candidates

A quota is set (often Droop)

Candidates reaching quota elected; surplus votes transferred

Lowest candidates eliminated; votes transferred until all seats filled

Produces proportional-ish outcomes within each multi-member district

Transfers reduce wasted votes and reward broad support

Combines proportionality with voter choice among candidates

Encourages local representation (district-based) with PR

Can reduce party control vs closed lists

Complex counting and longer tallies

Intra-party competition can be intense

District magnitude limits proportionality (small M less proportional)

Voters typically have two votes

Total seat entitlement determined by party vote

List seats “top up” parties to match proportional entitlement

May produce overhang/compensatory seats if a party wins too many districts

Party vote largely determines final seat shares (proportional overall)

District winners keep local link

Balances local representation with proportional outcomes

Reduces wasted votes compared with pure majoritarian systems

Supports multiparty representation while keeping constituencies

More complex system and seat calculations

Two classes of representatives perception (district vs list)

Overhang seats can enlarge legislature or reduce proportionality if uncompensated

Part of seats elected in districts (often FPTP)

Part elected by PR lists

Crucially: tiers are independent; no compensation

More proportional than pure FPTP, less proportional than MMP

Large parties can gain “bonus” from district tier

Simpler than MMP; adds some proportional representation

Maintains district link

Still can be significantly disproportional

Strategic voting and party fragmentation can persist

M-seat district; each voter casts one vote for one candidate

Top M candidates win

Can yield semi-proportional outcomes if parties manage nominations efficiently

High importance of vote management within parties

Simple ballot; can allow minority representation

Intra-party competition; factionalism

Results sensitive to nomination strategy

Voters have fewer votes than seats; can help minorities win seats

Voters can allocate multiple votes to one candidate; enables targeted support

More opportunities for minority representation than block vote

Still not fully proportional

Divides party votes by 1,2,3…; awards seats to highest quotients

Slight advantage to larger parties

Divides by 1,3,5… (or modified); more neutral for medium/small parties

Votes / seats; can favor smaller parties with remainders

Floor(votes/(seats+1)) + 1; common in STV